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V 
TECHNICAL NOTE D- 
INVESTIGATION OF 
S-IV ALL SYSTEMS VEHICLE EXPLOSION 
SUMMARY 
I n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  t h e  S-IV A l l  Systems Vehicle explosion indicated 
the  fol lowing:   high  explosive  equivalent ,  1 p e r c e n t ;   f i r e b a l l   d i a m e t e r ,  
380 f e e t ;  f i r e b a l l  d u r a t i o n ,  11 seconds; maximum fragment   radius ,  1500 
f e e t .  The r e l a t i v e l y  low y i e l d  w a s  due t o  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  i n s t a n t a n e o u s  
i g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  s p i l l e d  p r o p e l l a n t s  which probably  resu l ted  from the  
extreme  flammability  of  hydrogen. I f  t h i s  t r e n d  p e r s i s t s  i n  t h e  s c a l e  
model t es t  programs now i n  p r o g r e s s ,  some r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  60 percent  
h igh  exp los ive  equ iva len t  cu r ren t ly  used  fo r  s i t i ng  o f  LOX/LH2 veh ic l e s  
may be  poss ib l e .  
INTRODUCTION 
On January 24, 1964, t h e  S-IV A l l  Systems Vehicle exploded and 
burned during the terminal  s tages  of  the countdown f o r  i t s  i n i t i a l  
t e s t  f i r i n g .  The incident   which  occurred a t  Test Stand 1 of   the 
Douglas  Aircraf t  Company  (DAC), Sacramento t e s t  f a c i l i t y  was t h e  
second known f a i l u r e  i n v o l v i n g  s i g n i f i c a n t  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  t h e  p r o p e l l a n t  
Combination, LOX/LH2. Inasmuch as the   p rev ious   fa i lure   involv ing   these  
p rope l l an t s  occur red  du r ing  the  boos te r  phase  o f  t he  f i r s t  Cen tau r  
launch,  the S-IV A l l  Systems Vehicle explosion w a s  t h e  f i r s t  f o r  which 
a de ta i l ed  examina t ion  o f  t he  r e su l t i ng  damage w a s  poss ib l e .  
A number of small scale s t u d i e s  c u r r e n t l y  are being conducted to  
assess the  hazards  assoc ia ted  wi th  the  use  of  LOX/LH2 and other  pro-  
pel lant  combinat ions;  however ,  extrapolat ion of  the resul ts  of  these 
s t u d i e s  t o  o b t a i n  s i t i n g  c r i te r ia  in t roduces  a considerable  degree of  
unce r t a in ty  which can best  be el iminated or  minimized by tes ts  in-  
vo lv ing   fu l l - sca le   t ankage   of   f l igh t   weight   cons t ruc t ion .   Al though 
such tests are contemplated,  they are not  expected to  be accomplished 
be fo re  FY-66. Therefore ,  i t  w a s  considered  mandatory  that  a compre- 
hens ive  inves t iga t ion  be  made of  the S-IV A l l  Systems Vehicle explosion 
and tha t  t he  in fo rma t ion  b.e ana lyzed  wi th  r e spec t  t o  the  cu r ren t ly  
a c c e p t e d  s i t i n g  c r i t e r i a  f o r  LOX/LH2. 
THE. COMMITTEE- 
The chairman of the investigating committee was D r .  W .  R. Lucas, 
Chief of the  Materials Division, Propulsion and Vehicle Engineering 
Laboratory,   Marshall   Space  Flight  Center (MSFC). The a l t e r n a t e   c h a i r -  
man was D r .  J. B.  Gayle,  Chief of the Physical Chemistry Section, 
Chemistry  Branch,   Mater ia ls   Divis ion,  MSFC. Other members from MSFC 
were: Mr. H. C.  Dyer, Test Laboratory; Mr. L. L .  Roberts ,   Safety 
Office;  and Mr. 0. S .  Tyson, MSFC res iden t  eng inee r  a t  DAC Sacramento. 
Members f rom  other  NASA organizat ions  were:  D r .  F. E .  Be l l e s ,  Lewis 
Research Center;  Mr. P. V. King, Cape Kennedy;  and Mr. G. D. McCauley, 
NASA Headquarters.  Members from A i r  F o r c e   i n s t a l l a t i o n s  were: Mr. . 
C .  R. Cooke,  Edwards A i r  Force  Base,  and Mr. L. J. U l l i a n ,  P a t r i c k  
A i r  Force  Base. D r .  P .  A .  Longwel l ,   Ca l i fo rn ia   In s t i t u t e  of  Technology, 
s e rved  a s  a member r ep resen t ing  DAC. Consul tants   to   the  commit tee  were 
Mr. A .  J .  Hoffman, Ba l l i s t i c  Resea rch  Labora to r i e s  (BRL), and Mr. W. M. 
Smalley, Aerospace Corporation. 
MODE OF INVESTIGATION 
The committee  met a t  9:00 a.,m. a t  DAC, Sacramento on February 5 ,  
1964. D r .  Lucas was unable   to   a t tend   because  of a longstanding 
previous commitment so the  a l t e rna te  cha i rman ,  D r .  Gayle ,  presided.  
He s t a t ed  tha t  t he  pu rpose  of the  committee was to  inves t iga t e  the  
n a m e  and magnitude of the explosion, insofar as possible ,  f rom a 
post-mortem examination, but was not  to  cons ider  the  cause  of the 
f a i l u r e  e x c e p t  as i t  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  magnitude of the explosion. 
Information  prepared  in   advance was d i s t r ibu ted .   Th i s   i nc luded  
a i r  and  ground-based  photographs of the  t es t  s tand  and maps of the 
a rea  showing  fragment  dispersion  and  glass  breakage. A b r i e f i n g  OR 
the  events  lead ing  to  the  explos ion  and the  then -cu r ren t  t heo r i e s  r e -  
garding the probable  cause of  the explosion were given by Mr. Ted 
Gordon,  Chief  Engineer,  WC,Sacramento.  Four  color  films of the 
explosion were shown: one from each of the upstream and downstream 
cameras located roughly 300 f e e t  from the stand, and  one  from  each  of 
two engine area cameras located approximately 10 f e e t  f rom the vehicle  
on t h e  l e v e l  j u s t  below t h a t  a t  which the explosion appeared to occur.  
A f t e r  d e t a i l e d  i n s p e c t i o n  of  these  f i lms ,  the  group v is i ted  the  
explosion s i t e  f o r  a quick look and then  r econvened  fo r  i n i t i a l  
discussions.   Because i t  was e v i d e n t  t h a t  a systematic  examination was 
essent ia l ,   the   commit tee  was d iv ided   in to   th ree   g roups .  One group was 
r e spons ib l e  fo r  su rvey ing  the  en t i r e  a rea  to  ob ta in  de t a i l ed  in fo rma t ion  
on  fragment  dispersion. A second-group was r e spons ib l e  fo r  no t ing  the  
damage su f fe red  by small, nea rby  s t ruc tu res  such  a s  Bu t l e r  bu i ld ings  
and t r a i l e r s .   T h i s  group  also examined seve ra l  damaged beams loca ted  
on  the  t e s t  s t and  in  the  immedia t e  v i c in i ty  o f  t he  exp los ion .  The 
l a s t  group  examined the  tes t  s t a n d  i n  a s  much d e t a i l  as time permitted. 
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After completion of these assignments, the committee reassembled 
for   fur ther   d i scuss ion .   Because  i t  ' appeared   imprac t ica l   to   a t tempt  
an  on- the-spot  assessment  of  the  f ind ings ,  spec i f ic  i.tems of da t a  were 
a s s igned  to  va r ious  ind iv idua l s  fo r  cons ide ra t ion  and eva lua t ion  
fol lowing  the  meet ing.   After   receiving  these  ass ignments ,   most   of  
these individuals  spent  the second day of  the meet ing obtaining ad-  
di t ional  photographs,  measurements ,  and other  per t inent  information on 
the i r   ass igned   por t ions   o f   the   inves t iga t ion .   Arrangements  were made 
t o  o b t a i n  similar d a t a  f o r  LOX/RP-1 explosions for comparison, and 
l ia i son  wi th  the  commit tee  inves t iga t ing  the  cause  of  the  explos ion  was 
e s t a b l i s h e d .  The tes t  s tand   then  was r e l e a s e d   t o  Mr. 0. S .  Tyson,  and 
the meeting was adjourned. 
FINDINGS 
Weights  and cond i t ions  of  on-board p r o p e l l a n t s  and p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  
gases  a t  the time o f  t he  exp los ion  a re  g iven  in  Tab le  I. The ind ica t ed  
weights of LOX and LH2 were ,  respec t ive ly ,  84,244 and 16,954 pounds f o r  
a combined propellant weight of 101,198 pounds. 
A de ta i l ed  d i scuss ion  of the events preceding the explosion and 
the probable  underlying causes  of  the incident  are  contained in  the 
c l a s s i f i ed  r epor t  o f  t he  commi t t ee  r e spons ib l e  fo r  i nves t iga t ing  th i s  
a spec t  of the  incident   (Ref .  1). The immediate  cause  of  the  failure 
was the   overpressur iza t ion   of   the  LOX conta iner .   Ext rapola t ion  of 
t e s t  r e c o r d s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  f a i l u r e  o c c u r r e d  a t  a LOX pres su re  of 
approximately 100 psia or well above the design l i m i t  f o r  t h e  v e h i c l e .  
Frame-by-frame inspec, t ion of  the var ious f i lms suggested that  ini t ia l  
rupture occurred around the periphery of the common bulkhead and that 
ign i t ion  occurred  immedia te ly  upon rupture .   Thus,   there  was no v i s u a l  
o r  o t h e r  e v i d e n c e  t o  i n d i c a t e  s p i l l a g e  of the  LOX be fo re   i gn i t i on .   Th i s  
c o u l d  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  r u p t u r e  of t he  ex te rna l  sk in  o f  t he  LOX tank was 
followed by similar rupture of the LH2 t ank  wi th in  a few mi l l i seconds .  
Another  fa i lure  mode which cannot be excluded i s  t h e  i n i t i a l .  r u p t u r e  
of the common bulkhead,  probably with s imultaneous igni t ion of  the 
p r o p e l l a n t s ,  and subsequent  rupture  of  the external  skin of  the vehicle .  
S t i l l  o t h e r  modes are possible;  however ,  regardless  of  the actual  mode 
of f a i l u r e ,  a l l  a v a i l a b l e  e v i d e n c e  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  was l i t t l e  o r  
no time fo r  mix ing  o f  t he  p rope l l an t s  be fo re  ign i t i on .  In spec t ion  of 
t he  f i lms  sugges t ed  tha t  t he . exp los ion  o r ig ina t ed  nea r  t he  cen te r  l i ne  
of  the t es t  s tand  rand near the deck of level No. 5 .  Inspec t ion  of 
damage t o  t h e  t es t  s t a n d  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  c e n t e r  of the explosion 
could be approximately located a t  a p o i n t ,  i n  t h e  v e r t i c a l  d i r e c t i o n ,  
midway between the juncture of the common bulkhead and the side wall 
and the uppermost portion of the curved bulkhead. 
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It a l s o  a p p e a r e d  t o  b e  f i v e  f e e t  t o  t h e  west of t he  ver t ica l  c e n t e r  l i n e  
of the  tank.   Thus,   the   apparent   center  of de tona t ion  was a t  a he igh t  
of 55 feet  above the hard surfaced apron on which the s tand was loca ted  
and f i v e  f e e t  west o f  t he  no r th - sou th  cen te r  l i ne .  
Inspect ion of  photographs prepared by en larg ing  ind iv idua l  f rames  
from one of the engine area cameras  ind ica ted  tha t  the  in i t ia l  mot ion  
of the  vehic le  caused  by the explosion had a d e f i n i t e  w e s t e r l y  v e c t o r .  
This was determined by l o c a t i n g  r e a d i l y  d e f i n a b l e  p a r t s  of t h e  v e h i c l e  
w i t h  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  t es t  s tand  s t ruc ture  f rom photographs  taken  
immediately  before  and  after  the s t a r t  of   the  explosion.  The r e s u l t s  
a r e  shown i n  FIG 1. The movement from l e f t  t o  r i g h t  shown i n  t h i s  
f i g u r e  r e p r e s e n t s  movement i n  a n o r t h - w e s t  d i r e c t i o n .  S i n c e  t h i s  
a n a l y s i s  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  i n i t i a l  movement of t he  uppe r  pa r t  of t he  
v e h i c l e  was Poward r a the r  t han  away from the apparent center of the 
explosion,  i t  appears  tha t  thebr inc ipa l  explos ion  may have been pre- 
ceded by a smaller one located near  the per iphery of  the vehicle .  
The area surrounding the t es t  s tand  was roped off immediately 
a f t e r  t h e  e x p l o s i o n ,  and access was r i g i d l y  c o n t r o l l e d  t h e r e a f t e r .  
T h i s  g r e a t l y  f a c i l i t a t e d  t h e  work  of the commit tee  and,  in  par t icular ,  
insured  the  va l id i ty  of  surveys  of  shrapnel  d i spers ion  and  tes t  s tand  
d ama ge . 
Figure 2 shows the  t es t  s t and  and  v i c in i ty  a f t e r  t he  exp los ion .  
In spec t ion  of t h i s  f i g u r e  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  o v e r h e a d  c r a n e  and 
s u p p o r t i n g  s t r u c t u r e s  were v i r t u a l l y  undamaged and t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t s  
of the explosion were l a rge ly  conf ined  to  the  tes t  s tand proper .  
F igure  3 i s  a map showing the  loca t ion  of  debr i s  which  was 
d ispersed   as   shrapnel .   Table  I1 g i v e s   t h e   i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  the 
fragments shown on FIG 3 .  Table I11 i s  a t a b u l a t i o n  of the  approximate 
s i zes ,  we igh t s ,  and loca t ions  ( in  d i s t ance  f rom the  cen te r  of the ex-  
p los ion)  of  f ragments  se lec ted  for  poss ib le  de ta i led  inves t iga t ion .  
Glass breakage occurred a t  d i s t a n c e s  up to  approximate ly  1,100 
f e e t  from the center of the explosion, a s  shown i n  FIG 4.  Most 
s i g n i f i c a n t  t o  t h i s  s t u d y  were windows broken in guard shacks,  house 
t r a i l e r s ,  and Bu t l e r  bu i ld ings .  
The Butler BuildiQg designated TS-1 suffered what w e  considered 
r e l a t i v e l y  l i g h t  damage ( F I G  5 ) .  One end  of t h i s  b u i l d i n g  was, pos i t ioned  
f a c i n g  t h e  b l a s t ,  w i t h  t h e  n e a r e s t  s u r f a c e  a t  a d i s t a n c e  of 210 f e e t  
from a point  on the ground direct ly  below the  assumed cen te r  of the 
explosion.  Damage t o  t h e  tes t  s tand i s  descr ibed  by i n d i v i d u a l   l e v e l s .  
Basement Level 
The doors of the basement switch and generator room were blown i n -  
ward  and were o f f  t he i r  h inges .  These were metal doors,   each 4 f t .  2 i n .  
by 8 f t .  6 i n .  However, no damage was done i n s i d e  t h e  room. 
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Level No. 1 
The e leva tor  car  exper ienced  some deformation of the roof  down- 
ward,  and  one sheet  metal  panel  of the roof  was peeled  upward.  There 
had  been a small f i r e  i n  t h e  e l e v a t o r .  The double  metal  doors (4-1/2.11 
by 8 ' 6 " )  of the  te rmina l  room were blown inward, one being blown o f f  
i t s  hinges.  A cab ine t  was h i t  by the  door ,  and t h i s ,  i n  tu rn ,  jammed 
a desk.  Otherwise,   there was no apparent  damage i n  t h e  t e r m i n a l  room. 
The ga lvanized  i ron  roof  over  the  stair  landing between levels 1 
and 2 was deformed, and p a r t  was blown-off. 
Level No.  2 (F i r ing  Level )  
Much debr i s  had , fa l len  f rom above ,  bu t  there  was l i t t l e  damage t o  t h e  
s t a n d  a t  t h i s  level. There  had  been some f i re  because f lammable items 
were s inged.  It appeared   tha t   d rople t s  of l i q u i d  oxygen  had  sprayed 
t h e  a r e a  s i n c e  p a i n t  on the s teel  was c h a r r e d  i n  a d r o p l e t  p a t t e r n .  
However, t he  s teel  had not  been heated appreciably.  
Some exposed wiring a t  the south end  of t he  l eve l  was badly charred.  
Liquid oxygen  had apparently flowed over the south concrete deck. 
Level No. 3 
There was r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  d e b r i s  a t  t h i s  l e v e l .  Exposed wir ing  
was cha r red  in  many i n s t a n c e s ,  and e l e c t r i c a l  power c a b l e s  i n  t h e  v e r t i c a l  
cab le   duc t  had cha r red  in su la t ion .  A l i gh twe igh t  shee t  me ta l  a i r  duc t  
was smashed. The s t r u c t u r e ,  however, was e s s e n t i a l l y  undamaged. Pa in t  
was cha r red  in  a drople t  pa t te rn ,  p resumably  because  of  l iqu id  oxygen 
spray ,  bu t  the  metal had not been heated appre.ciably.  
The l i q u i d  oxygen s led   d id   no t   appear  damaged. On t h e   l i q u i d  
hydrogen s l e d ,  flammable  foam i n s u l a t i o n  was burned and valve handles 
were  singed,  but damage appeared  inconsequential  (FIG 6 ) .  
Level No. 4 
The cableways, made of  l ightweight  metal ,  were to rn  loose  and 
dis tor ted;   exposed wires were  charred. The power c a b l e s  i n  t h e  v e r t i c a l  
cab le  duc t  were char red .  A few l i g h t  f i x t u r e s  were  knocked o f f  t h e i r  
condui ts .   There were f i r e  marks  on pa in ted  steel ,  apparent ly   due  to  
l i q u i d  oxygen d r o p l e t s ,  b u t  t h e  s tee l  had no t  been  hea ted  s ign i f i -  
c a n t l y ;  t h e r e  d i d  n o t  a p p e a r  t o  b e  s i g n i f i c a n t  s t r u c t u r a l  damage. 
The ' l i qu id  oxygen f l e x i b l e  f i l l  l i n e  was burned through a t  a 
poin t  wes t  of  the  vehic le  loca t ion  and  overhead.  Thi,s l i n e  was 
p a r t l y  p r o t e c t e d  by s t r u c t u r e  and p ip ing ,  and i t  appea red  tha t  t he  l i ne  
had  exploded  internally.   About 10 inches  of  l ine  was missing;  ends were 
burned, and e x t e r i o r  b r a i d  was folded back. 
5 
The conso le s  loca t ed  to  the  wes t  s ide  had been blown p a r t i a l l y  
over  and had suffered rather  extensive damage a l though there  had no t  
been much f i re .  However, the  g lass  covers  on pressure  gauges were n o t  
broken. The roof  panel  over  the console  had  been  blown down onto  the  
console .  
There was much.debris  f rom the vehicle  on the deck and pi led on 
top  of the engines,  which a t  f i r s t  g l a n c e  gave the impression that  
t h i s  l e v e l  was in   shambles .  However, s t r u c t u r a l  damage was s l i g h t ,  and 
f i r e  damage was t h a t  which would be expected from a r a t h e r  h o t ,  s h o r t -  
duration exposure,  which charred flammables but did not heat metal  
unduly (FIG 7 ) .  
Level No. 5 
Inspec t ion  of t h i s  l e v e l  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  e x p l o s i o n  c e n t e r e d  
on t h i s  l e v e l ,  p r o b a b l y  a few f e e t  above the deck and near the west 
s ide  of   the   vehicle .   There was a cons iderable  amount  of s t r u c t u r a l  
damage above  the  deck.  Safety  rail ings  were  torn-off  and  thrown away. 
Horizontal  wide flange I beams were ben t  ho r i zon ta l ly ,  and some were 
torn  loose.   These beams had  been  located  10-20  feet  above  the  deck, 
and deformations ranged up to  abou t  2 f e e t  i n  a 20-foot  length (FIG 8 ) .  
V e r t i c a l  columns  were a l s o  deformed, although to a much lesser 
extent  because they were of  heavier  sec t ion .  
The a i r -condi t ioned  ins t rument  room a t  the  west s i d e  was demolished 
by what  appeared  to  be  an  internal  explosion. The v e r t i c a l  power cable  
duc t  was badly deformed and broken open, and cable insulation was 
charred  badly.  The e l e v a t o r  s h a f t  g r i l l e  was blown i n ,  l i g h t s  were 
broken,  and  conduits  were  broken  off  their   supports.   There were no 
l i g h t w e i g h t  g u t t e r s  l e f t .  I n s t r u m e n t a t i o n  c a b i n e t s  on the  east  were 
severely burned on the  ou t s ide ,  had opened, and suffered some i n t e r n a l  
f i r e  damage. 
There was much debr i s  f rom the  vehic le  on t h i s  d e c k  a l s o ,  and some 
of the decking had  been  weakened. Many of  the t reads on the  s ta i rs  
l e a d i n g  t o  l e v e l  6 were bowed upward,  and some were p a r t i a l l y  cut by 
fragments.  
Level No. 6 
S t r u c t u r a l  members a t  t h e  d e c k  l e v e l  and above appeared t o  be 
undeformed excep t  fo r  one l i g h t  h o r i z o n t a l  beam a t  t h e  n o r t h  e n d .  The 
nor thwes t  h inged  f loor  gra t ing  was  wedged i n t o  a p a r t i a l l y  r a i s e d  
p o s i t i o n  by debr i s ,  wh i l e  t he  no r theas t  one was suppor ted  in  a r a i s e d  
p o s i t i o n  by in t e r f e rence  wi th  a r a i l i n g  p l a t e .  Some o f  t he  gua rd  r a i l s  
were bent .  The door t o  t h e  room a t  t h e  w e s t  s i d e  had  been  blown  open, 
and the  window opposite the door was blown out; however, there appeared 
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t o  b e  l i t t l e  damage t o  t h e  walls. The l a t t e r  appeared  to   be  1/4- inch 
s t e e l  and to  have  deformed  perhaps  one  inch i n  4-fOOt spank. No f i r e  
damage was appa ren t  w i th in  the  room even though papers were exposed. 
Level No. 7 and Above 
The shed on top of the elevator, which was covered with corrugated 
s h e e t  i r o n ,  had su f fe red  some b l a s t  damage; t he  shee t  metal was ben t  
and was r o l l e d - u p  o r  t o r n  l o o s e  i n  p l a c e s .  The v e r t i c a l  c a b l e  d u c t  was 
deformed  and  blown  open (FIG 9) . 
There appeared to be no other damage of consequence except that  
t h e  g l a s s  windows in  the crane cab were broken.  
SIGNIFICANCE OF FINDINGS 
WITH RESPECT TO MAGNITUDE OF  EXPLOSION 
S e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  e s t i m a t e s  of equiva len t  explos ive  weight  were 
obtained by cons ider ing  damage t o  s p e c i f i c  s t r u c t u r e s .  It i s  noted 
t h a t  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  s t r u c t u r e s  s e l e c t e d  f o r  a n a l y s e s  are  of widely 
d i f f e ren t  t ypes ,  r e spond ing  to  va ry ing  cond i t ions  o f  l oad - t ime  h i s to r i e s ,  
and t h a t  t h e  e s t i m a t e s  of y ie ld  requi red  to  produce  the  damages obtained 
may consequent ly   vary  considerably.  A t  t h e  f a r t h e r  d i s t a n c e s ,  a n  o v e r -  
p r e s s u r e  c r i t e r i o n  may more n e a r l y  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  of f a i l u r e .  
A t  t he  in t e rmed ia t e  d i s t ances ,  damage becomes  more a func t ion  of  a 
combination of overpressure and posit ive impulse;  while a t  the  very  
c lose - in  d i s t ances ,  an  impu l se  c r i t e r ion  may be  assumed to  govern.  
I n  a r r i v i n g  a t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e s t i m a t e s  of y i e l d ,  t h e s e  c r i t e r i a  h a v e  
been  assumed  and  judgments  have  been made from experience gained in 
c o r r e l a t i n g  t h e  damages f rom th is  acc ident  wi th  those  on  similar 
s t ruc tures  f rom known e x p l o s i v e  q u a n t i t i e s .  
Est imate  of Explosive Weight Based on Damage t o  TS-1 Bu t l e r  Bu i ld ing  
This  bu i ld ing  was a l igh tweight  shee t  metal s t ructure  measuring 
20' x 48' x 15'. It was pos i t ioned  end-on  to  the  d i rec t ion  of  b las t  
w i th  the  nea res t  end s u r f a c e  a t  a d i s t a n c e  of 210 f e e t  from a p o i n t  
on the ground directly below the assumed center  of  de tona t ion .  
Damage sus t a ined  by the  But le r  bu i ld ing  was cons idered  to  be  re- 
l a t i v e l y  l i g h t .  The most  extensive damage occurred on the  end f a c i n g  
t h e  b l a s t ,  which would have been within the Mach stem. A genera l  
d e s c r i p t i o n  of the damage would inc lude  a w r i n k l i n g  t o  a s l i g h t  c r u s h i n g  
of  the corrugated s tee l  panels  of  f rom four  to  s ix  i n c h e s  i n  b o t h  t h e  
s i d e  w a l l s  and roo f .  Seve ra l  windows were broken  on  the  s ides  rece iv ing  
the  more d i r e c t  b l a s t ,  b u t  o n l y  one was broken on ei ther  of t he  o the r  
two s i d e s .  S e v e r a l  s t r u c t u r a l  members i n  t h e  r o o f  were s l igh t ly  buck led  
o r  de f l ec t ed  a maximum of two i nches  wh i l e  s eve ra l  o the r s  were loosened 
a t  t h e  j o i n t s .  
It has been assumed t h a t  a r e f l ec t ed  ove rp res su re  of n e a r l y  f i v e  
p s i  would be  necessary  a t  the  near  end  of  the  bui ld ing  to  produce  
damage o f  t h i s  ex ten t  f rom a r e l a t i v e l y  s h o r t  ( s o m e t h i n g  l e s s  t h a t  50 
mi l l i s econds )  du ra t lon  b l a s t  wave. The s ide-on  overpressure  a t  the  nea r  
end of t h e  b u i l d i n g  would then be approximately 2 . 5  p s i  and would r e q u i r e  
a high explosive weight  of approximately 760 pounds. 
Estimate of Explosive Weight Based on Damage t o  Cover P r o t e c t i v e  Assembly 
The Cover P r o t e c t i v e  Assembly was a t runca ted  cone l ike  s t ruc tu re  (FIG 10) 
fabricated from aluminum, es t imated  to  be  approximate ly  1 /16  inch  th ick .  
I t s  base diameter was 1 2  f e e t ,  and i t  t a p e r e d  t o  a top-opening diameter 
o f  f o u r  f e e t .  I n  a l l ,  t he re  were 12   pane ls   fas tened  to l ong i tud ina l  
s t i f f e n e r s .  The h e i g h t  of   the   s t ruc ture  was approximately s ix  f e e t .  
The cover was pos i t ioned  face  down wi th  i t s  cen te r  125 f e e t  from a p o i n t  
on the  ground  beneath  the  explosion  center.   Permanent  inward  crushing, 
t o  a depth of s i x  i n c h e s ,  was observed  in  several of the  pane ls  fac ing  
t h e  b l a s t .  
The estimate of explosive weight required to produce such damage 
was made by us ing  damage threshold  curves  similar to  those  g iven  in  
BRL Memorandum Report  1461 bu t  r ev i sed  to  inc lude  r ecen t  da t a .  Fo r  
ana lys i s ,  the  cover  assembly  was t r e a t e d  a s  a r i g h t  c i r c u l a r  c y l i n d e r  
w i th   t he   fo l lowing   cha rac t e r i s t i c s :   l eng th ,  6 f ee t ;   d i ame te r ,  1 2  f e e t ;  
sk in   t h i ckness ,  0.062 incli; material, aluminum, It was f u r t h e r  assumed 
t h a t  t h e  s t i f f e n e r s  i n c r e a s e d  by l 0 , p e r c e n t  t h e  o v e r p r e s s u r e  r e q u i r e d  
for   c rush ing .  The a n a l y s i s  shows that   an  explosive  charge  of  TNT 
weighing 1,200 pounds woul'd be required to  produce approximately the 
same degree of  damage.  The ana lys i s  a l so  inc ludes  the  a s sumpt ion  tha t  
t h e  s t r u c t u r e  would have been i n  t h e  Mach stem p o r t i o n  of t h e  b l a s t  
wave. 
Estimate of Explosive Weight Based on Damage t o  I-Beams 
The beam chosen  for  ana lys i s  (FIG 11) was t h e  h o r i z o n t a l  s t r u c t u r a l  
member (8WF 17 I-Beam, 25 f e e t  l o n g )  , l oca t ed  on the  no r th  s ide  of t h e  t e s t  
s tand  a t  level 5 .  All t he  ho r i zon ta l  members a t  t h i s  l e v e l  were damaged, 
as were some a t  the  nex t  h ighe r  l eve l ,  10 fee t  above .  This  beam was 
s e l e c t e d  f o r  a n a l y s i s  s i n c e  i t s  permanent  def lect ion was apprec iab ly  
more t h a n  a l l o w a b l e  i n  t h e  e l a s t i c  r a n g e  w i t h o u t  e x c e s s i v e  b u c k l i n g .  
The beams on t h e  west s i d e  were sheared from the ver t ica l  member and 
s e v e r e l y  d i s t o r t e d  and  buckled. The permanent  deformation of the  
ho r i zon ta l  beam on t h e  e a s t  s i d e  was cons idered  to  be  too  near ly  the  
maximum a l l o w a b l e  e l a s t i c  d e f l e c t i o n  a n d ,  t o  some e x t e n t ,  was sh ie lded  
by the tank from the .explosion center .  
To a r r ive  to  an  e f f ec t ive  we igh t  based  on  beam damage, an  ana lys i s  
based on work  by Nor r i s ,  e t  a l . ,  of t he  Massachuse t t s  In s t i t u t e  of 
Technology  (Ref. 2) was employed. The method involves   t ransforming  the 
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a c t u a l  beam system into an ideal ized mass-on-spring,  s ingle-degree 
of   f reedom  system.  Certain  t ransformation  factors   are   appl ied,  and 
the system i s  ana lyzed  in  the  p l a s t i c  r ange .  
To per form the  ana lys i s ,  cer ta in  assumpt ions  concern ing  the  
loading had t o  be made. For s impl i c i ty ,  t he  beam was cons idered   to  
be  simply  supported  and  uniformly  loaded.  In  actuali ty,   the beam 
was f i x e d  t o  t h e  v e r t i c a l  columns  and was probably not loaded uniformly 
s ince  one  end was s e v e r a l  f e e t  c l o s e r  t o  t h e  a p p a r e n t  c e n t e r  of explosion 
than  the  o ther .  It was a l s o  assumed tha t  t he  load ing  was impulsive 
wi th  a pos i t ive  dura t ion  approximate ly  1 /20  the  na tura l  per iod  of  the  
beam. The beam was considered  loaded  in   the  s t rong  direct ion;   however ,  
observa t ions  showed t h a t  some load ing  a l so  occur red  in  the  weak d i r e c t i o n .  
Based  on the permanent  def lect ion of approximately 1 2  i n c h e s  a t  t h e  
center  of  the beam and a d i s t ance  of 1 3  f e e t  from the center of explos ion  
to  the  beam c e n t e r ,  i t  i s  e s t ima ted  tha t  a high explosive weight of 
. 1,000  pounds would  be required  to   produce  such damage. This  i s  be- 
l i e v e d  t o  be an upper bound  on the explosive weight needed to produce 
' such a deformation  based on t h i s   a n a l y s i s .  It i s  t o  be  noted  that   de- 
formation i s  based on the magnitude of impulse associated with 1,000 
pounds  of high explosive and t h a t  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  p r e s s u r e - t i m e  
h i s t o r y  of  the fuel  explosion and h i g h  e x p l o s i v e  a t  t h i s  d i s t a n c e  may 
b e  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  
Estimate o f  Explo-sive .. . Weight  Based  on  Glass Damage 
Before at tempting to  judge the s ize  of the  explosion  from  the 
g l a s s  b r e a k a g e ,  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n h e r e n t  i n  t h i s  method  of e s t ima t ion  
should be pointed out.  
The f i r s t  c a u s e  f o r  c o n c e r n  i s  tha t  t he  r ange  of p re s su res  r e -  
qu i red  to  break  windows i s  r e l i ab ly  r epor t ed  to  r ange  from 0 . 1  t o  2 . 0  
ps i ,  depending  upon t h e  s i z e ,  t h i c k n e s s ,  and  mounting  of  the  glass. 
The damage done t o  t h e  windows o f  t h e  l a r g e  d o u b l e  t r a i l e r  a t  t h e  t e s t  
s i t e  i s  a pe r fec t  ca se  in  po in t .  The re  were   th ree   ident ica l  windows  on 
the   s ide   fac ing   the   explos ion .  Each  had two panes,   one  f ixed and  one 
ho r i zon ta l ly   s l i d ing .   In   each   ca se ,   t he   f i xed   g l a s s  was broken.  Thus, 
a t  f i r s t  g l a n c e  one  might  conclude  tha t  the  t ra i le r  was a t  the  exac t  
"average" dis tance for  glass  breakage s ince exact ly  half  the panes 
were  broken. However, c lose r   i n spec t ion  showed tha t   the   f ixed   panes  
were h e l d  i n  t h e i r  aluminum frames by p l a s t i c  s t r i p s  and glue,  whereas 
the  movable  panes  were s e t  i n  r u b b e r .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  t h e  f i x e d  
panes broke because they were inherently more suscep t ib l e  to  b reakage .  
The second  r eason  fo r  cau t ion  in  us ing  th i s  method  of a s ses s ing  
b l a s t  y i e l d  i s  tha t  co r re l a t ions  fo r  g l a s s  b reakage  t ake  the  fo rm:  
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Here, d i s  the  average  d is tance  for  g lass  breakage;  W the weight  of 
explosive,  and K i s  a constant .  Thus,  an est imate  of W from d involves  
(d/K)3, so  t h e  r e s u l t  i s  ex t r eme ly  sens i t i ve  to  the  poor ly  de f ined  
parameter d . 
Subjec t  t o  t he  fo rego ing  r e se rva t ions ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  g e t  a n  
es t imate  of t h e  y i e l d .  I n s p e c t i o n  of a l l  a v a i l a b l e  d a t a  i n d i c a t e d  
tha t  t he  ana lys i s  p robab ly  shou ld  be  r e s t r i c t ed  to  ev idence  f rom on ly  
two s i tes  of g lass  breakage .  
a .  A l l  the  window panes  fac ing  the  center  of t h e  ‘ b l a s t  were 
broken in  the  guard  house ,  5 4 0  f e e t  from the explosion. 
b .  Of the  18 panes i n  t h e  pump house t h a t  were r o u g h l y  i n  l i n e -  
o f - s i g h t ,  s i x  were  broken, 700 f e e t  from the explosion. 
A t  both locat ions,  the panes were of  the same th ickness  and were 
s i m i l a r  i n  s i z e ;  some of  them were  glazed i n  a s imi l a r  f a sh ion .  
These  da ta  ind ica te  tha t  the  average  d is tance  for  g lass  breakage ,  
i . e . ,  t he  d i s t ance  a t  which about  half  the glass  would have been broken, 
was between 5 4 0  and 700 f e e t .  An appropr ia te  formula  to  use  i s  a s  
fol lows : 
Using a va lue  of 6 2 0  f e e t  f o r  d ,  which corresponds to a po in t  loca ted  
halfway between the two s t r u c t u r e s ,  W i s  e s t ima ted  to  be about 1,400 
pounds.   This  corresponds  to a s ide-on  pressure  of   about  0 . 7  p s i  a t  
620 f e e t ,  which i s  within the expected range.  
Est imate  of Explosive- Keight Based on Fragnent~_Disp_ersio-n 
Fragment dispers ion data  can be used to  obtain an est imate  of  
equivalent  weight  of  explosive i f  information i s  ava i l ab le  fo r  t he  
d i s t ance  t r ave led ,  c ros s  sec t iona l  a r ea ,  we igh t ,  and d r a g  c o e f f i c i e n t  
of individual  f ragments ,  and a l s o  f o r  t h e  v e l o c i t y  and d i r e c t i o n  of the 
prevai l ing  winds a t  the  time of the  explosion.  For  the S-IV A l l  Systems 
Vehicle  explosion,  selected fragments  were  weighed  and  measured. 
Drag c o e f f i c i e n t s  were estimated based on the following assumptions: 
a .  P l a t e s  were   cons idered   to   be   rec tangular   in   shape ,   re la t ive ly  
t h i n ,  and s u b s t a n t i a l l y  f l a t .  The f l i g h t  a t t i t u d e  was taken t o  be 
normal t o   t h e   t r a j e c t o r y   f o r  213 of the  distance.   These  assumptions 
led  to  the  fo l lowing:  
cD assumed 2 / 3  c~ normal 
A assumed - A normal - 
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b.   Cyl inders  were cons ide red   t o   be   so l id  and t o  tumble so t h a t  
112 of f l i g h t  was i n  normal  and  112 i n  a x i a l  a t t i t u d e .  These  assumptions 
.led to  the  fo l lowing :  
E cD ax la1  + cD normal 
assumed 2 
- 
A assumed - A a x i a l  + A normal 2 
c. Rectangular blocks were approximated by cubes  which were 
assumed t o  tumble i n  f l i g h t .  These  assumptions  led  to  the  following: 
assumed CD normal 
A assumed = A normal 
Ex t reme ly  l imi t ed  in fo rma t ion  ind ica t ed  tha t ,  a t  t he  time of the  
explosion,  the wind a t  ground l e v e l  was from the southwest a t  r o u g h l y  
8 t o  1 2  knots .  N o  information was a v a i l a b l e  f o r  a l t i t u d e s  g r e a t e r  
than 100 f e e t .  
F igures  12  and 1 3  i n d i c a t e  t h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  i n i t i a l  v e l o c i t y  
and d i s t ance  t r ave led  fo r  f r agmen t s  o f  d i f f e ren t  d rag  coe f f i c i en t s ,  c ros s  
s e c t i o n a l  a r e a s ,  and weights using an assumed f l i g h t  a n g l e  of 4 5 " .  
Table I V  g i v e s  t h e  i d e n t i t i e s  and p e r t i n e n t  d a t a  f o r  s e l e c t e d  f r a g m e n t s  
from the S-IV A l l  Systems Vehicle explosion and i n i t i a l  v e l o c i t i e s  
estimated from F I G  1 2  and 13.  
To obta in  an  es t imate  of  equiva len t  explos ive  weight ,  the  in i t ia l  
v e l o c i t i e s  g i v e n  i n  T a b l e  I V  were  compared wi th  unpubl i shed  da ta  for  
f r agmen t s  r e su l t i ng  from explosions involving known weights of high 
explosive.  For  American  2,000-pound  general  purpose bombs conta in ing  
approximately 1,100 pounds of  high explosives ,  secondary s t ructural  
fragments had i n i t i a l  v e l o c i t i e s  g e n e r a l l y  w i t h i n  i 2 0  p e r c e n t  of those 
c a l c u l a t e d  f o r  s e l e c t e d  S-IV A l l  Systems Vehicle fragments having similar 
d rag   coe f f i c i en t s .   Fo r  American  1,000-pound bombs conta in ing  530 
pounds of high explosives,  secondary structural  fragments had i n i t i a l  
veloci t ies  appreciably lower (approximately 40 percent )  than  those  for  
S-IV A l l  Sys tems Vehic le  f ragments  wi th  s imi la r  drag  coef f ic ien ts .  
Therefore ,  a va lue  of approximately 1,100 pounds of TNT i s  t aken  fo r  
comparison with the other  es t imates .  
The lack  of  prec ise  wind da ta  and the necessi ty  for  assuming a 45" 
a n g l e  o f  f l i g h t  g r e a t l y  l i m i t  the  va lue  of e s t ima tes  of equiva len t  
explosive weights  based on f ragment  d ispers ion  pa t te rns .  The r e s u l t  
of t h i s  a n a l y s i s  of se lec ted  f ragments ,  therefore ,  i s  included  only 
because it tends  to  conf i rm the  estimates obtained by other methods. 
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Summary of-  Explosive Weight. Es t imates  
The seve ra l  e s t ima tes  of explosive weight may be summarized as 
fo l lows  : 
Basis 
Damage to  Bu t l e r  Bu i ld ing  
Damage t o  Cover P ro tec t ive  As,sembly 
Damage t o  I-Beams  on Test Stand 
Glass Breakage 
Fragment Dispersion 
Estimated Weight 
Pounds - 
760 
1200 
1000 
1400 
1100 
Average 1090 
The agreement between estimates derived by d i f f e r e n t  i n v e s t i g a t o r s  
from analyses of diverse types of damage i s  s u r p r i s i n g l y  good ( a l l  
va lues  wi th in  250 percent of the average value) and may be f o r t u i t o u s .  
Based  on t h e  t o t a l  w e i g h t  of on-board propellants a t  the time of the 
explosion,  the average TNT y i e l d  i s  about  =e percent  by weight.  
”-
T h i s  r e l a t i v e l y  low y i e l d  (one percent )  may be  compared with the 
va lue  of 60 p e r c e n t  c u r r e n t l y  u s e d  f o r  s i t i n g  of LOX/LH2 v e h i c l e s .  
Since only that  port ion of  the propel lants  which i s  mixed a t  t h e  time 
of i gn i t i on  can  con t r ibu te  to  the  y i e td  of  an explosion,  the inf luence 
of i g n i t i o n  d e l a y  time on the magnitude of explosive yields i s  m a r k e d 3  I I n  gene ra l ,  i t  would  be  expec ted  tha t  the  y ie ld  for  any  par t icu lar  
quan t i ty  of p rope l l an t  and  any mode of f a i l u r e  would inc rease  from a 
very low value approaching zero for  a zero  de lay  t ime to  a maximum 
v a l u e  f o r  a delay time of a few seconds and then gradually ,decrease 
because  of loss of p rope l l an t s  by evapora t ion . )  This  sugges ts  tha t  the  
subs t an t i a l ly  in s t an taneous  ign i t i on  of the propel lants  discussed above 
was l a r g e l y   r e s p o n s i b l e   f o r   t h e   r e l a t i v e l y  low explos ive   y ie ld .   There-  
f o r e ,  i t  i s  impor tan t  to  cons ider  whether  s imi la r ly  shor t  ign i t ion  de lays ,  
and consequent ly  s imi la r ly  low explos ive  y ie lds ,  can  be  expec ted  in  
f u t u r e   i n c i d e n t s .  No d e f i n i t e  c o n c l u s i o n  t o  t h i s  e f f e c t  i s  p o s s i b l e  a t  
t h i s   t i m e .  However, the   genera l ly  low y i e l d s   ( l e s s   t h a n  15 percent )  
expe r i enced  wi th  f a i lu re s  of LOX/RP- l  v e h i c l e s  s u g g e s t  r e l a t i v e l y  poor 
mixing .   Moreover ,   smal l   sca le   sp i l l   t es t s   involv ing  LOX/LH2 f r equen t ly  
have r e su l t ed  in  p rema tu re  ign i t i on  because  o f  s t a t i c  d i scha rges  o r  
other   causes .  Also ,  t e s t s  i n  which burst   diaphragms  have  failed due to  
overpressur iza t ion  wi th  hydrogen  gas  have  resu l ted  in  ign i t ion .  S imi la r  
premature ignitions have not been experienced with LOX/RP-1. EThese 
fac tors ,  therefore ,  sugges t  tha t  the  ex t reme f lammabi l i ty  of  LH2 may 
serve  to  reduce  i t s  explosive hazard by in su r ing  minimum i g n i t i o n  d e l a y s  
Unfor tuna te ly ,  the  reduct ion  in  explos ive  y ie ld  may be accompanied by 
an increase in  the frequency of  explosions resul t ing from minor l eaks  
o r  s p i l l s  t h a t  would n o t  become c a t a s t r o p h i c  i f  i g n i t i o n  d i d  n o t  o c c u r .  
r 
1 
1 2  
SIGNIFICANCE OF FINDINGS 
WITH RESPECT TO SIZE AND DURATION OF FIREBALL 
Figure 14 was reproduced from the fi lm of the  explos ion  taken  
with the downstream camera; arrows indicating the diameter of the 
f i r e b a l l  a r e  i n c l u d e d  f o r  r e f e r e n c e . .  These d a t a  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  
f i r e b a l l  r e a c h e d  some 70 pe rcen t  of i t s  maximum diameter of 380 f e e t  
wi th in   about  two seconds ,   engul f ing   the   en t i re  t e s t  s tand .  It 
appea red  to  beg in  to  d imin i sh  in  in t ens i ty  a f t e r  abou t  e igh t  s econds  
and  had s u b s t a n t i a l l y  s u b s i d e d  a f t e r  11 seconds,  although some burning 
of combustible materials and of propel lan ts  leak ing  f rom open  l ines  
cont inued  for  approximate ly  s ix  hours .  The water  deluge  system was 
r ende red  pa r t ly  inope ra t ive  by the explosion and had l i t t l e  e f f e c t  
d u r i n g  t h e  f i r s t  few seconds. 
Figure 15 shows the  maximum diameter  a t ta ined  by t h e  f i r e b a l l  
wi th  s imi la r  va lues  der ived  f rom smal l  sca le  exper imenta l  t es t s  and 
f u l l  s c a l e  v e h i c l e  f a i l u r e s  i n v o l v i n g  LOX/RP-1 and LOX/LH2 and 
N204/Aerozine 50. The da ta   a r e   l oga r i thmica l ly   r e l a t ed   i n   acco rdance  
wi th  the  equat ion:  
Log y = 0.992 + 0.320 log x 
y = maximum d i a m e t e r  o f  f i r e b a l l ,  f e e t  
x = weight of p r o p e l l a n t s ,  pounds 
Sy = s t anda rd  e r ro r  of values of log y ca l cu la t ed  wi th  
Eq. 1 = 0 . 1 2 2  
(sa = s t anda rd  e r ro r  of i n t e r c g p t  of  Eq. 1 = 0.036 
Ob = s tandard  e r ror  of  s lope  of Eq. 1 = 0.012 
Al though  the  ind iv idua l  va lues  exh ib i t  cons ide rab le  sca t t e r ,  t h i s  appea r s  
t o  be  l a rge ly  a s soc ia t ed  wi th  the  va r i ab i l i t y  of r e s u l t s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  
f a i l u r e  modes and de lay  t imes  for  a g iven  p rope l l an t  r a the r  t han  be ing  
caused by p l o t t i n g  d a t a  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  p r o p e l l a n t s  on a s ing le  graph .  
The s lope  o f  t he  l i ne ,  0 .320 ,  does  no t  d i f f e r  s ign i f i can t ly  from a 
value  of  0.33.  Thus,  i t  appears   that   cube  root   scal ing  used  for   other  
explosive parameters  probably i s  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  f i r e b a l l  s i z e s .  
Figure 16 shows the  du ra t ion  of  t h e  f i r e b a l l  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  
s i m i l a r  v a l u e s  f o r  small sca le  exper imenta l  s tud ies  and f u l l  s c a l e  
v e h i c l e   f a i l u r e s .  These d a t a  scat ter  wide ly   and ,   therefore ,  are 
compatible  with equat ions having a wide  range  of  slopes.   For  consistency 
wi th  the  r e su l t s  ob ta ined  f rom the  o the r  exp los ive  pa rame te r s ,  a s lope  
of  0.33 i s  uked; t h i s   appea r s   t o   adequa te ly   desc r ibe   t he   da t a .  No doubt ,  
much of t he  obse rved  sca t t e r  i s  due t o  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  j u d g i n g  when 
t h e  f i r e b a l l  h a s  s u b s i d e d .  
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Inspect ion of  the tes t  s tand and i t s  immediate  sur@oundings 
i n d i c a t e d  s u r p r i s i n g l y  l i t t l e  damage due t o  f i r e .  Moreover,  wherever 
evidence of burning was noted, the extreme lack of uniformity and 
occurrence of  spot ted burning pat terns  suggested’  that  the dispers ion 
o f  l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  of LOX by the explosion markedly influenced the 
ex ten t   o f  damage. More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  i t  appeared  that   charr ing  of  
pa in t ed  su r faces  was i n  many ins t ances  conf ined  to  a reas  exposed  to  
LOX. It was of i n t e r e s t  t o  n o t e  some of   the items on the  var ious  
leve ls  which  were  not  apprec iab ly  a f fec ted  by t h e  f i r e .  Thus, a nylon 
rope on l e v e l  No. 3 showed only one small (1/8-inch  diameter)  singed 
area .  Scraps  of a rubber ized  fabr ic  used  as a r a i n  s h i e l d  f o r  t h e  u p p e r  
l e v e l s  were sca t t e red  abou t  t he  t es t  stand.  Although i t  was subsequently 
found t h a t  t h i s  m a t e r i a l  was badly burned by a 30-second exposure t o  a 
700°F environment, most of the scraps noted about the t e s t  s tand ex-  
hibi ted only local ized burning or  scorching,  which suggests  that  the 
damage was l i m i t e d  t o  t h o s e  a r e a s  c o n t a c t i n g  LOX. 
Information expected to be derived from the small  scale tes t  
programs should permit an estimate of the temperature of a b lack  body 
r ad ia to r  approx ima te ly  equ iva len t  t o  the  f l ame  from a LOX/LH2 explosion 
Such an  e s t ima te  coup led  wi th  the  f i r eba l l  du ra t ion  w i l l  pe rmi t  ca l -  
c u l a t i o n  of t h e  h e a t  f l u x  t o  a capsule  or  other  exposed object .  
SIGNIFICANCE OF  EXPLOSION WITH 
RESPECT TO PROBABILITY  OF  UTURE  INCIDENTS 
Because of the extremely l imited experience,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  
cons ider  the  s ign i f icance  of the  S-IV A l l  Systems Vehicle explosion 
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of f u t u r e  i n c i d e n t s  f o r  LOX/LH2 v e h i c l e s .  
The hazard  involved  in  tests wi th  ba t t l e sh ip  t ankage  would 
be  expec ted  to  be  fa r  less t h a n  t h a t  f o r  tes ts  u s i n g  f l i g h t  w e i g h t  
hardware .   This   d i scuss ion ,   therefore ,  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  s t a t i c  tes ts  and 
launches of Centaur  and S-IV f l i g h t  w e i g h t  v e h i c l e s .  T a b l e  V summarizes 
expe r i ence  wi th  these  veh ic l e s  t o  Apr i l  20, 1964.  Although i t  i s  some- 
times a rgued  tha t  t ank ing  ope ra t ions  a re  less haza rdous  than  s t a t i c  
f i r i n g s  o r  l a u n c h e s ,  i t  should be noted that  the tanking operat ions 
occur ear l ie r  i n  t h e  development when t h e  v e h i c l e  may be  cons idered  less  
proven.  Also,  i t  must  be  emphasized that  both  the  Centaur  and  the S-IV 
A l l  Systems Vehicle explosions occurred beforeignition. 
On t h i s  b a s i s ,  t h e  two fa i lures  cor respond to  approximate ly  four  
percent   of   the   populat ion.   Tables   given  in   the  appendix  of   Lloyd  and 
Lipow provide an upper confidence l i m i t  f o r  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  f u t u r e  
inc iden t s  of approximately 16 pe rcen t  fo r  a conf idence  coe f f i c i en t  of 
0 .99  o r  10 pe rcen t  fo r  a conf idence  coe f f i c i en t  of 0 .95 .  Therefore ,  
i t  appea r s  t ha t ,  even  i f  t he  p robab i l i t y  o f  fu tu re  inc iden t s  i s  decreased 
as a r e s u l t  of l ea rn ing ,  a s u f f i c i e n t  number of  incidents  can be expected 
t o  w a r r a n t  c a r e f u l  a t t e n t i o n  t o  r i s k s  and t rade-off  considerat ions 
a t t e n d a n t  t o  s i t i n g  of tes t  and launch operations.  
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BLAST GAUGES 
While  examination  of  the  damage  resulting  from  an  incident  of 
this  type  permits  a  rough  estimate  of  the  magnitude  of  the  explosion, 
a  much  more  quantitative  estimate  would  be  possible  if  blast  gauges  had 
been  installed  at  the  test  site.  Inasmuch  as  this  lack of instrumentation 
resulted  in  loss  of  quantitative  blast  data  which  probably  would  cost  in 
excess  of  one  million  dollars  to  duplicate  in  a  controlled  experiment,  it 
is  considered  essential  to  take  additional  steps  to  insure  that  any  future 
incidents  are  adequately  instrumented. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The  evidence  obtained  from  the  different  parts  of  this  investigation 
appears  to  support  the  following  conclusions: 
1.  The  damage  resulting  from  the S-IV All Systems  Vehicle  explosion 
was  relatively  slight  and  may  be  characterized  as  follows: 
Maximum  fragment  radius 1,500 feet 
Maximum  fireball  diameter 380 feet 
Fireball  duration 11 seconds 
Explosive  yield 1 percent 
2. The  relatively  low  yield  was  due  to  substantially  instantaneous 
ignition  of  the  spilled  propellants,  which  suggests  that  the  extreme 
flammability  of  hydrogen  may  provide  generally  shorter  ignition  delays 
than  those  experienced  with  LOX/RP-l  for  actual  vehicle  failures.  If 
this  trend  can  be  substantiated,  some  reduction  in  the 60 p rcent  TNT 
equivalent  currently  used  for  siting  of  LOX/LH2  vehicles  may  be  possible. 
3 .  Unfortunately,  the  extreme  flammability  of  hydrogen  may  tend  to 
increase  the  frequency  of  incidents  since  small  spills  or  leaks  which 
would  otherwise  be  of  no  consequence  may  undergo  ignition  and  lead  to 
catastrophic  failure.  The loss of  two LOX/LH2 vehicles  out  of 4 9  tanking 
and  firing  operations  to-date  tends  to  substantiate  this  possibility. 
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TABLE I 
PROPELLANTS AND GASES ON BOARD 
ALL SYSTEMS VEHICLE AT TIME OF EXPLOSION 
LOX Indicated Weight 
LH2 Indicated Weight 
LOX Tank Pressure  
LH2 Tank Pressure 
Cold He Bo t t l e  P res su re  
Cold He Bottle Temperature 
Volume LOX Tank 
Volume LH2 Tank 
Volume Cold He Sphere 
(3 requi red)  
84,244 Lbs. 
16 , 954 Lbs. 
100 p s i a  - (Approximate) 
4 1  p s i a  
800 p s i a  
Off Scale  ( to  approx. 25"R) 
1 ,263  F t3  ( spec i f i ca t ion  va lue )  
4 ,197  F t3  ( spec i f i ca t ion  va lue )  
3 .5  F t  each  ( spec i f i ca t ion  va lue )  
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TABLE I1 
IDENTIFICATION  OF FRAGMNTS SHOWN 
ON FIGURE  3 
Southwest . . . - . . - Quadrant 
A-1 216 
217 
218 
21 9 
220 
221 
222 
223 
2  24 
226 
227 
293 
229 
A-3 228 
231 
233 
274 
291 
292 
A-2 225 
A-5 232 
A-6 230 
290 
261 
294 
234 
296 
A-7 295 
A- 8 
A-9 297 
B-4 235 
B-8 300 
B-9 298 
C-2 289 
C-4 262 
C-5 239 
237 
273 
C-7 236 
C-8 656 
C-10 659 
Fuel  Tank  Wall 
LOX Fill  Line  Elbow  or  Fuel TK Outlet  Elbow  to Low  Pressure  Duct 
Forward  or  Aft  Interstage  Structure 
Forward  or  Aft  Interstage  Structure 
Fuel  Tank  Dome 
Fuel  Tank  Wall 
Common  Bulkhead 
Fuel  Tank  Wall 
Common  Bulkhead 
Fuel  Tank  Wall 
LOX  Tank  Vent  Outlet  Elbow 
Forward  or  Aft  Interstage  Structure 
LOX  Tank  Vent  Outlet  Elbow 
Aft  Interstage  Structure 
Aft Interstage  Structure 
Tank  Structure  Common  Bulkhead  Joint 
Fuel  Tank  Fwd  Dome & Wall  Section 
P/N  1A22765-1004  VDA  Electrical  Assembly 
Fuel  Tank  Low  Pressure  Duct 
Vehicle  Roll  Ring  Support  Lug  38717 (8 or  6) 2 - 401 
Fuel  Tank  Bulkhead  Attach  Pt.  With  Vacuum  Port 
Fuel  Tank  Wall .a 
Anti  Vortex  Screen 
Accel. & Mt.  Blk.  Accel. S/N EA03 & EA02 
Aft  Interstage  Structure 
Chilldown  Duct  Around  Vehicle 
Fuel  Tank  Structure 
Lower  Skirt  Skim 
Fuel  Tank  Anti  Vortex  Screen 
Fuel  Chilldown  Doughnut  Around  Vehicle 
Fwd.  Int/Stg.  Bulkhead & T/M & CDR  Antenna  CDR  Cable  #4lOWlOpL 
Chilldown  Duct  1A01734-A45-1 
Aft Interstage  Structure 
Meter IU Substitute  Panel 
IU  Substitute  Panel  Meter 
Fuel  Tank  Structure 
Interstage  Structure  Fwd  Fuel  Tank 
Accel. & Mt.  Blk.  FA08 & EA09 
Fuel Tank Skin 
Hyd Tank Skin 
Skirt  Structure 
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TABLE I1 (Continued) 
c-10 664 Common  Bulkhead 
D-3 239  Fuel  Tank  Structure 
D-6 238  Fuel  Tank  Structure 
E-1  260  Fuel T a d  Structure Cold Helium  Bottle  Mount  Area 
280  Fuel  Tank  Structure 
E-2 275 SI - Substitute  Name  Plate 
E-5 260 T/M Ant.  SW  P/N  2884053-505F 
E-8 6-80A Steel  Stand  Structure 
E-9  6-68 Wires - W 745818 
YY 742818 
YY 744A18 
W 740A18 
E-10 299  Fuel  Tank  Wall 
F-2 278 Interstage Structure 
F-3 242  Fuel  Tank  Pressurization  Duct 
F-4 244 Point  Level  Sensor & Temp Probe - Fuel  or  LOX  Tank 
F-5 243  Fuel  Tank  Structure  Cold  Helium  Bottle  Mount 
6-4 240  Fuel  Tank  Structure 
J-6 241  Fuel  Tank  Structure 
Northwest 7 Quadrant 
A-1 5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
24 
25 
41 
42 
43 
B-3 44 
B-1 45 
1 
2 
3 
16 
18 
T.V.  Camera  Lens  Portion 
Vehicle  Instr.  Temp.  Assy.  With  Probes  Probably LH2 Tank 
FWD Dome  Found  on  Def.  Plate 
Stand  Sheet  Metal 
Camera  Lite 
Blower 
IU SI Substitute  Panel  Meter 
IU SI Substitute  Panel  Meter 
4th  Level  Dust  Fill  Room  Door 
Blower & Motor 
Fuel  Tank  Pressurization  Flange & Clamp 
Fwd  Dome  (Piece)  Found  on  Deflector  Plate 
Vehicle  Instr.  Temp.  Assy.  With  7861475-567P  Temp.  Probes 
Base IU SI Rack 
IU SI Substitute  Control  Console 
2-1 112  Forward  Dome  Fuel  Vent  Valves  Ducting 
4882757 
Top  Panel  IU SI Substitute 
Probe  7869839-501 
Vehicle  Wire & Plug 
Vehicle  Temp.  Probe  7861475-567P 
Door  4th  Level  Dust  Free  Room 
Wall -- Dust  Free  Room ' 
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TABLE I1 (Continued) 
B-1 19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
34 
35 
36 
A-3 29 
30 
B-2 7 
D-1 27 
F-1 28 
D-3 4 
c-3 39 
A-4 31 
A-7 40 
D-5 37 
D-6 38 
C-6 32 
D-7 26 
G-2 26 
41 
H-1 62 
H-2 67 
1-3 63 
H-3 29 
211 
65 
68 
G-4 216 
F-5 221 
H-5 619 
G-5 218 
H--5 614 
H-6 613 
A-7 654 
651 
B-7 638 
,237 
636 
C-7 660 
D-7 639 
63  5 
631 
3871762-4 
LH2  Tank 
Vehicle  Elect.  Connector 
Type  T42K  3 x 2  Regulator  Face 
GSE  Cable  Assembly 
Cable  Assy.  GSE  Controls 
GSE  Cable  Assembly 
1734  Chilldown  Duct 
Common  Bulkhead 
1A76599 
Stand  Structure 4 x 10 Sheet  Metal 
Interface  Purge  Duct 
Vehicle  Instr.  Temp.  Tree  Probably  LH2  Tank 
T/M & CDR Antenna  P/N  5883605-1-0023 
Temp.  Probe  S/N  1340N 
Fwd.  Interstage  Bulkhead  (2' x 4') 
Endevco  Accel.  22150-S/N  FA05 
S/N  EA04 
Common  Bulkhead  3 x 3 
LH2  Tank  Wall  (2' x 4') 
Fwd  Interstage 1 x 1 
Plate 
Vehicle  Panel  With  Weld Bead 
Tank  Skin 
Tank  Skin 
LH2  Tank  Structure 
Vehicle  Body  Panel 
Vehicle  Panel 
Hat Section 
1803734 - Vent  Duct 
LH2 Structure  Tank 
Aft Interstage  Skirt 
Tank  Skin 
Aft  Interstage  Skirt  (Outer  Surface) 
LH2 Tank  Structure 
Thrust  Struct  Skirt 
LH2  Tank  Structure 
Skirt  Structure 
Lower  Skirt  Skin 
LH2  Tank  Structure 
LH2  Tank  Structure 
LH2  Tank  Structure 
Wire 
Skirt  Channel 
Skirt 
P/N  1836695-1 
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TABLE I1 (Continued) 
D-7 630 
H-7 620 
6-7 623 
A-8 15.5 
249 
653 
B-8 252 
658 
657 
64  5 
641 
640 
648 
166 
23 3 
2  34 
C-8 161 
D-8 162 
E-8 228 
F-8 224 
229 
G-8 626 
627 
622 
244 
64  6 
B-9 242 
E-9 665 
A-10 663 
A-13  667 
A-14 269 
B-15  670 
A-15  271 
A-16 173 
B-16  674 
A-17  622 
D-20 175 
B-22  676 
C-22  677 
E-30 178 
A-9 247 
LH2  Tank  Structure 
Skirt  Structure 
Common  Bulkhead  Flange 
LH2  Tank  Temp.  Probe & Support 
LH2  Vent  Line  Section 
Common  Bulkhead 
LH2  Tank  Structure 
Bulkhead  LOX 
LH2  Tank  Structure 
Skirt 
LH2  Tank  Skin 
LH2  Tank  Structure  (Large) 
Aft  Skirt  Outer  Skin 
Tank  Structure 
Two (2)  Pieces  LH2  Tank  Structure 
LH2  Tank  Structure 
LH2  Tank  Structure 
LH2  Tank  Structure 
Tank  Structure 
LH2  Tank  Structure 
LH2  Tank  Structure 
LH2  Tank  Structure 
Tank  Skin 
Skirt  Structure 
LH2  Tank  Structure 
Thrust  Structure  Skirt  Member 
Skirt  Structure 
Tank  Structure 
Skirt  Structure 
Fwd  Dome  Structure 
LH2  Tank  Structure 
Common  Bulkhead  One  Face  and  Honeycomb 
Common  Bulkhead 
Aft Skirt  Piece  With  Spacer Bolt 
Aft  Skirt  Spacer  Strip 
LH2  Tank  Insul.  Liner 
Tank  Skin 
Strip - Common  Bulkhead  Skin 
LH2  Tank  Skin 
Common  Bulkhead 
Aft Interstage  Skirt  Section 
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TABLE I1 (Continued) 
Northeast . .  - Quadrant 
A-l~ 
A- 3 
A- 4 
A-  5 
A- 6 
A- 7 
B-1 
B-2 
B-3 
B-4 
B- 6 
D- 1 
D-2 
c-2 
c-4 
D-6 
P- 1 
P- 9 
P-10 
VDA- 1 
VDA- 2 
GSE - 1 
P-16 
G-4 
P-15 
VDA-4 
VDA- 6 
VDA- 5 
VDA-  3 
P- 2 
P- 5 
P-12 
P-  7 
P-11 
P- 8 
VDA- 9 
VDA- 10 
P- 20 
GSE-  6 
G-3 
VDA- 8 
P- 14 
P- 13 
GSE - 2 
P-4 
P-3 
GSE-  5 
VDA- 7 
LH2 Side  of  Bulkhead 
Support  for  lAO1738--55  Duct 1BXXXX;rS Support 
LH2 Fill  Diffuser  Into  Tank  With  Bellows 
Pipe Assy. With  Wires 
Temp.  Probe  Assy.  S/N  1751,  S/N  1788,  S/N  1747, S/N 1761 
S/N  1762 
Lamp  Fixture 
5 ' x 5'  Section LH2 Tank  Fin V1 
114 Fuel  Low  Press.  Outlet 
Stand  Common  Cover 
Part 4' x  3'  Common  Bulkhead 
Ignition  Firing  Unit S/N 017 
Bracket  Assy.  A-176 
Ignition  Firing  Unit  S/N  019 
Ignition  Firing  Units  411A1 & 411A2 
Diff.  Door  S/N  153 
Aft  Section  Structure  With  Clips  1A36530-1-2  each 
7851806-503 F6rD Valve  S/N  11084-011-004 
Diff.  Door  S/N  174 
1824862-1  Expansion  Joint 
1801734-55  Duct 
Potentiometer  Cover 
Accelerometer  S/N  2958  (A352),  S/N  2966  (A353) 
LH2  Tank  Vortex  Screen 
Cable  Tray 
Instrumentation  Wiring 
Bracket  Assy . 1822765-1003 
Section  Common  Bulkhead  with  Pumping  Port & T/A  to 
Manif  old 
Vortex  Screen  for  Fuel  Tank 
Lighting  Fixture 
1834689  Shroud  (Part of) 
1801734  Duct  N/A 
1AX6289-A45-1  Shroud,  1801734  Vent Fwd Retainer  Ring 
Part  of  Instrumentation  Temp.  Assy.  with  Probe  LOX  or LH2
Tank 
Extensometer 
1801734-4732  Duct 
A-1 2 Common  Bulkhead 
3  Skin  Retro  R cket 
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TABLE I1 (Continued) 
A-1  4 
' 5  
6 
7 
8 
50 
51 
52 
49 
74 
75  
B - 1  48 
47 
45 
46 
73 
54 
53 
A-2 60 
19 
20 
61 
70 
72 
7 1  
69 
9 
10  
11 
c-2  44 
A - 3  62 
17 
18 
B-2 68 
B-3  67 
A-4 65 
63 . 
59 
15 
16 
14 
13  
43 
64 
B-4 10-4 
A f t  S k i r t  S k i n  
LH2 - 'Tank Skin 
Common Bulkhead 
fie1 Tank Skin 
LOX Tank Baff le  (P iece)  
Common Bulkhead 
LOX Tank I n t e r n a l  
P iece  Eng.  Duct 
Bulkhead Seam 
Common Bulkhead 
Piece Bulkhead Seam 
Piece  Common Bulkhead 
Piece  Common Bulkhead 
Piece Support  Structure ,  (Tube)  LOX Tank P a r t  No. 
XXXXXX3-403 
Common Bulkhead 
Cable Assy. 41CW222 
L i t e  F ix tu re  Cover Ex Type 
Fwd o r  A f t  S k i r t  
Fuel Tank Skin 
LH2 Tank I n s u l .  
Common Bulkhead 
Common Bulkhead 
A f t  S k i r t  
Common Bulkhead 
Fwd o r  A f t  S k i r t  
Elect. F i t t i n g s  (Ex) 
Common Bulkhead 
Bulkhead 
Bulkhead 
Explosion Proof Light Fixture (Stand) 
LH2 Tank Skin 
LH2 I n s u l a t i o n  
A f t  S k i r t  
Common Bul  khe  ad 
Common Bulkhead Seam 
Common Bulkhead 
Common Bulkhead Honey Comb 
Common Bulkhead 
Common Bulkhead 
LH2 Tank Skin 
Common Bulkhead 
T/S Structure  Sheet  Metal  
P iece  Common Bulkhead 
Pot Type Xducer S/N 1455 
Fwd - Pad P/N 3871762-4018 
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TABLE I1 (Continued) 
B -4 
A- 5 
A- 6 
B- 6 
D - 7  
D-8 
G- 2 
G-4 
H- 1 
12  
66 
57 
4- 1 
21 
58 
41 
56 
55 
4 2  
6-32 
6-43 
6-48  
6-10  
6-12 
6-17 
6-25 
6 -4  
Fuel  Tank Skin 
Common Bulkhead LH2 - LOX Seam 
Common Bulkhead 
Common Bulkhead 
LOX Tank Vent S e c t .  A f t  S k i r t  
Chilldown Vent 
7866357-1 (Spec.  Cont. Dwg.) 
Chilldown Vent a t  Turnbuckle T i e  Down 
LH2 - LOX Bulkhead Seam 
Sensor & Mount DAC Pa r t  No. 7861475-567M S/N 1742 
Common Bulkhead Flange 10'' x 3" 
Outer  Vehic le  F i l l  L ine  Elbow - 45" 4" 
Hyd. Tank Skin Outer 2'  x 3 ' 
T . S .  Cover Rod & Canvas 
LOX Tank Skin 3" x 3" 
Thrus t  S t ruc ture  Skin  4" x 4" 
Power Supply Elect .  Box P/N 7860719-509  41501 
LOX Tank Skin 
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TABLE I11 
DATA FOR  SELECTED  FRAGMENTS 
Item 
No. 
1. 
-
2 .  
3 .  
4 .  
5 .  
6 .  
7 .  
8 .  
9 .  
Weight  Distance  Size 
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  L i s .  F t  . I n .  
SW A-9 297 54 400  3  x 11 
- Shape 
Cy l ind r i ca l  
SW B-9 298 14 400 
End V i e w  
SW B-8 300 1 9  350 11 x 48 Cy l ind r i ca l  
SW A-7 295  9  300  20 x 11 Squashed 
Cy1 inder  
SW A-7 234 
4-56-6A 
5  325 18 x 8 I r r e g u l a r  
F l a t  P l a t e  
1 2  260 21  x 11 Squashed 
Cy1 inder  
A-5  SN4-1 14 225 78 It  
Common Bulkhead 
A-8  296 2 350 1 2  x 12 F l a t   P l a t e  
SW A-5 Fuel 33 
Tank Bulkhead 
230 
10. SW A-3 231 
11. 4-41-5B 
24 
2 220  30 x 6 
25 175 56 
Cyl indr ica l  
TABLE I11 7 (Continued) 
I t e m  
- No. I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
12 .  4-44-2C 
1 3 .  1-B-4-48 
14 .  P-14 3-+ 2+D 
15 .  KRS #16 
Common Bulkhead 
1 6 .  3-62 
Weight  Distance  Size 
Lbs . F t .   I n .  Shape 
11 
- 
110 10  Max. E l e c t r i c a l   L i g h t
Diam. F ix tu re  Base 
1 60 1-3/4 I D  Cy l ind r i ca l  
Tube 
12  180 
1/2"  Thick 
4 50 24 x 10  Th in   P l a t e  - 
10  120 l o x  7 I D  Electr ic  
L igh t  F ix tu re  
17 .  P-12 3-+2ttB  -1/2 110 1 7  x 16  x 2 F l a t  
Af t  Sec t ion  
S t r u c t u r e  
18. P-6 3-+2+B 
1 9 .  A - 3  Common 
Bulkhead T ie - In  
To Skin 
20. B-9 
90 100 
19 50 
- 
112" 
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TABLE 111 (Continued) 
Item 
No. 
21. 
22. 
-
23. 
24. 
Identification 
3B488 2757 
C-6 LH2 Bulk- 
head, Flat 
Plate 
A- 7 
VDA- 3 
Ignition  Firing 
Units 
Weight Distance . Size 
Lbs . Ft. In. .- 
13 ? 8 x 3 Dia 
24 300 2 x 4  
10  350 
9 350 
25. P-16  Section of 85-90 ? 
LH2 Tank  And  Common 
Bulkhead at Outer 
Skin 
26. A-6 4 300 
Ignition  Firing 
Unit 
27. 0-17 4 300 
Ignition  Firing 
Unit 
28. KRS 1/12 56 375 
LH2 Skin  Section  Hit 
Pence  While  Burning 
Fence  Not  Dented 
26 
2 x 4  
Shape 
Cylinder 
.Flat  Plate 
I' II I End View 
50" 
5" 
6 
u 5" 
TABLE I11 (Continued) 
I t e m  Weight  Distance  Size 
No. I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  Lbs . F t .   I n .  Shape 
29. RRS-13 26 375  48 x 36  Rectangular 
Fuel  Tank  Skin  Curved 
-
W 
30. F-1  Interface  150 225 24 Foot Long Cylinder 
Purge  Duct ( A l l  - (Diameter  Not Measured) 
One Piece)  
31. 100 Feet beyond the  LH2 Sphere are hundreds of pieces  of g l a s s .  
32. 7-B Major S i z e  110 350  120 x 78 F l a t   P e  
P a r t  LH2 Tank 
S t r u c t u r e  
33. 7-A 
LH2 Tank 
34.  6-2-47 
+ A + 9  
10  350 
8 450 
35. 8-B 100 450 
LH2 Tank (Burned) 
36. 6-41-8B 40 450 
37.  Grid 0-8 
Area 6-488 
LH2, Tank 
8 41 0 
30 x 24 F l a t   P l a t e  
24 x 30 F l a t   P l a t e  
*.72" 
140.4" 
24 x 36 I-J 
27 
Item - No. I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
3 8 .  7 - D  6-31 
3 9 .  Grid 8-G 
Area 6 Part 22 
4" buried i n  
Gromd  on Edge 
4 0 .  7-H 
Area 6 ,  Part  20 
41. 6-2-21  
Lnters tage  Sk ir t  
+ F + 5  
4 2 .  10-A 363 
LH7 Tank 
TABLE I11 (Continued) 
Weight Di s tance  S i z e  
Lbs . Ft. In. - Shape 
7 500 28 
7 550 
26 550 
FwdL. Dome Structure  
L ] 19" 
30  Est 1100 18 If 
28 
TABLE 111 (Continued) 
. Item  Weight Distance Size - No. Identification . . . . . , Lbs . Ft. - In. Shape 
43. - 6-67 
13- -A 
La2 Tank Structure 
44. c-10 
Area 6-59 
C ommon Bul khe ad 
20 ( E s t )  1100 
42" r 
Gnd . 
Side" - __ Level 
I Y  
Front 
Curved 
P1 ane 
Z 
5(Est) 800 24 
24" 
NOTE: All weights over 80 pounds were estimated. 
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TABLE I V  
CALCULATION OF INITIAL 
VELOCITIES FOR SELECTED FRAGMENTS 
~ . 
~~ 
. ~~~ - ." ~ ~~ ~ 
IterJ: Weight Assumed Area CD A Distance,  Min. Vel. 
No. l b s .  ~. .~ ~ GP @L" W F e e t  ~~ ~~- Fee t /Sec . "" - - 
~ ~~ .~ ~ ~.  . . .. " 
1 54 .77 1.48 .021 400 130 
2 14 .79  . 8 .027 400 137 
3 19 .78 2.16 .089 35 0 180 
4  9 .79  2.36 .207 300 45 0 
10 25 .88  1.94 .068 175 95 
14 1 2  .79 1.11 .073 180 95 
25 87.5 .79  21.6 .195 300 -351) 5  30 
26 4 1.6 .26 . lo4  300 165 
27 4 1.6 .26 . l o4  300 165 
39 7 .79 2.5 .282 550 > 4000 
40 26 .79 7.37 . 2  24 550  3000 
1900 ' 41 28 .79  10.9  .308  350 
9~ Item numbers r e f e r  t o  T a b l e  111. 
JcJc Assumption of 45" f l i g h t  a n g l e  g i v e s  v e l o c i t i e s  e q u a l  t o  o r  less 
than actual. I 
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TABLE V 
SUMMARY  OF  LOX/LH2  EXPERIENCE 
WITH FULL-SCALE  FLIGHT  WEIGHT TANKAGE''c 
F l i g h t  and Tanking 
S t a t i c  F i r i n g s  Operations 
S -Iv 
Centaur 
5 6 
28 10 
fc Numbers are estimates based on r e s u l t s  of informal 
inqu i r i e s  t o  Genera l  Dynamics, L e w i s  Research 
Laboratory,  and Marshall  Space Flight Center 
personnel .  
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FIGURE: 1. MOVEMENT OF VEHICLE AFTER EXPLOSION 
32 
FIGURE 2. VIEW OF TEST STAND AFTER EXPLOSION 
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FIGURE 3 .  FRAGMENT DISPERSION  PATTERN 
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FIGURE 4 .  GLASS  BREAKAGE  PATTERN 
W 
m 
FIGURE 5.  DAMAGE TO  BUTLER BUILDING, TS-1 
. FIGURF, 6 .  L I Q U I D  HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN SLEDS (3rd LEVEL) 
37 
FIGURE 7 .  VEHICLE DEBRIS ON TOP OF ENGINES (4th LEVEL) 
FIGURE 8. BENT STRUCTURAL MEMBERS (5 t h  LEVEL) 
c 
0 
FIGURE 9. CABLE RACEWAY AND ELEVATOR SHED (6th AND 7th  LEVEL) 
FIGURE 10. COVER PROTECTIVE ASSEMBLY 
. 
FIGURE 11. DAMAGED 1-B-EA.M 
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FIGURE 12. R E U T I O N  BETWEEN I N I T I A L   V E L O C I T Y  AND GROUND RANGE 
(LOW VELOCITY RANGE) 
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FIGURE 13. RELATION BETWEEN I N I T I A L   V E L O C I T Y  AND GROUND RANGE 
(HIGH VELOCITY RANGE) 
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FIGURE 1 6 .  FIREBALL DURATION  FOR VARIOUS WEIGHTS AND TYPES OF PROPELLANTS 
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